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A B S T R A C T
For reaching the 2 °C climate target, the robust growth of electricity generation from variable renewable energy
sources (VRE) in the power sector is expected to continue. Accommodation of the power system to the variable,
uncertain and locational-dependent outputs of VRE causes integration costs. Integrating VRE into a well-
functioning electricity market can minimize integration costs and drive investments in VRE and complementary
flexible resources. However, the electricity market in the European Union (EU), as currently designed, seems
incapable to deliver this end. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive literature review of barriers to the
large-scale market integration of VRE in the EU electricity market design. Based on the set-up of the EU
electricity market, a framework was developed to incorporate the most pertinent market integration barriers
and resulting market inefficiencies.
This paper concludes that an overhaul is needed for the current EU electricity market to address all barriers
identified. Firstly, a discrete auction intraday market, a marginal pricing balancing market, a two-price
imbalance settlement and a nodal pricing locational marginal pricing mechanism seem more promising in
limiting integration costs. Secondly, to support business cases of VRE and complementary flexible resources in
the electricity market, a level playing field should be established and the price cap should be lifted up to the
value of lost load (VOLL). Meanwhile, to fit VRE's market participation, a higher time resolution of trading
products and later gate closure time in different submarkets would be required. Lastly, feed-in support schemes
currently widely used for VRE investments might be inconsistent with market integration, as they increase
integration costs and lock VRE investments in a subsidy-dependent pathway. To avoid such lock-in, further
investigation of alternative capacity-based support schemes is recommended.
1. Introduction
The Paris Agreement aims to limit the increase of the global average
surface temperature to 1.5–2 °C above pre-industrial level to avoid the
worst impacts of climate change [119]. Keeping the temperature
increase well below 2 °C through cost-effective strategies requires the
decarbonization of the power sector, which accounted for 38% of global
energy-related CO2 emissions in 2013 [74,80]. Variable renewable
electricity (VRE), which is electricity generation from stochastic energy
flows (e.g. wind and solar), plays an indispensable role in replacing
fossil-fired electricity production that, next to climate change, cause
other negative externalities including air pollution and energy insecur-
ity [103,13,81,89]. According to the 2 °C scenario of the International
Energy Agency (IEA), the contribution of VRE to global electricity
supply has to increase from 4% in 2013 to 25% in 2040 [75]. Similar
figures are found for the European Union (EU) that should increase the
share of VRE in gross electricity generation from 11% in 2014 [50] to at
least 36% by 2050 to contribute to its long-term emission reduction
target [36]. VRE, characterized by variability, uncertainty and loca-
tional-dependence, however, interacts with the non-VRE part of the
power system (hereafter referred to as the residual system). This
results in technological, institutional and managerial challenges asso-
ciated with grid operation, such as the increased need for flexible
resources (e.g. flexible plants, storage, demand response, grid infra-
structure) and power quality control, better inter-regional coordination
and sophisticated method to size reserve. They often cause extra
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operational and investment costs in the residual system to accommo-
date VRE ([113,61,65,72,5,17]). These costs are often labelled as
integration costs,1 which increase with the rising penetration of VRE.
They inevitably become notable when VRE penetration reaches 10%.
Various sources [68,118,72,113] indicate that at 10% penetration,
integration costs are 9–13 €/MWh for onshore-wind and 26.5–32
€/MWh for solar PV. Integration costs can act as an economic barrier
for the continuous growth of VRE [118]. Integration costs reduction
becomes increasingly prominent in today's energy policy agenda [107].
Despite an emphasis on “cost-effectiveness” and “cost-efficiency” in the
EU's official Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon
Economy [34] and Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union
with a Forward-looking Climate Change Policy [38], few efforts have
been made yet by policy-makers and regulators for the minimization of
integration costs [107,93].
Many parts of the world (including the EU) have established
liberalized electricity markets to facilitate the trade of electricity and
boost economic efficiency. A well-functioning competitive electricity
market can theoretically limit integration costs associated with a given
penetration of VRE. This is the case because a theoretical long-run
equilibrium exists to deliver the least-cost residual system, which
minimizes integration costs. An electricity market functions well, if
its price signals support efficient short-term operation and provide
sufficient investment incentives for all generation capacity
needed [33,69,51,6]. This means that it should be able to provide
sufficient remunerations to recover capital costs and support business
cases for investments in VRE and complementing low-carbon flexible
resources, which are indispensable to adapt to the variable and
uncertain outputs of VRE. Otherwise, the least-cost residual system
will not be reached. However, in absence of a level playing field due to
incomplete internalization of social costs of carbon (SCC) and (explicit
and/or implicit) subsidies for fossil fuels, the electricity market cannot
effectively promote VRE investments in line with the EU's deep
decarbonization goal [35]. This justifies the adoption of various
national support schemes, which has driven the rapid and large-scale
capacity expansion of VRE in the EU. These schemes aim to financially
secure capital-intensive VRE investments against market revenue
risks2 and thus reduce the cost of capital [76,98,101,128]. Their
implementation has also contributed to significant costs reduction of
VRE technologies, because of economies of scale and technological
learning [29,90]. Nevertheless, support schemes, in particular the feed-
in tariff, typically create market distortions in operational decisions,
due to limited exposure and/or response of VRE generators to market
signals [6,10,36,49]. Moreover, such schemes often grant priority
dispatch3 and, sometimes, exemption of balancing responsibilities4 to
VRE generators, regardless of price signals that reflect their negative
impacts on system operation [19,30,31,49,85]. These all might con-
tribute to increased residual system costs and thus increased integra-
tion costs [99,107,36,62,9,93].
The lack of alignment of VRE development with market price signals
have gained increasing concerns, as the penetration of VRE continues to
grow [128]. To reduce integration costs and improve economic efficiency,5
many studies and most EU stakeholders (including the EC) suggest that as
an increasingly-mature technology, VRE should be progressively inte-
grated into the electricity market (hereafter referred to as “market
integration”) [1,18,40,46,49,62,128,6,35,37,39,106,71]. Despite the lack
of a standard definition, two dimensions of market integration, with
respect to different time horizons, can be drawn from existing literature:
• Firstly, in the short-run, VRE should be exposed and respond to
short-time market price signals as much as possible via more
market-compatible support schemes, in order to minimize distor-
tions [34,36,41,18,128].
To fulfill this dimension, the EC's Environmental and
Energy State Aid Guidelines [37] has obliged direct market
participation, balancing responsibilities and the removal of sub-
sidies during negative price periods to new VRE installations from
2016 onwards. However, many scholars and stakeholders point out
that this also requires the adaption and improvement of electricity
market design [104,43,61,76]. As the current market design was
historically selected for a power system dominated by dispatchable
plants, it may not well suit a power system where VRE plays a
growing important role [61]. Furthermore, due to design flaws,
certain elements in the existing market design may be incapable of
delivering price signals that reflect real market conditions and
associated costs [121,20,31,62].
• The second dimension of market integration lies in that support
levels should be degressive and eventually be phased out once VRE
becomes fully commercially mature [37].
This means that in the long-run, VRE investments should be
mainly driven by market price signals to avoid lock-in into a
subsidy-dependent pathway [20,76]. Many authors and stake-
holders also stress their concern for a level playing field. They argue
that the incomplete internalization of externalities and subsidies for
fossil fuels place VRE at a competitive disadvantageous position.
Even if VRE becomes fully commercially mature, support schemes
may still be necessary in order to compensate for the unleveled
playing field [39,5,51,75,128].
Synthesizing all these views, market integration can be defined as a
dynamic transition of letting the investment and production of VRE be
increasingly driven by market price signals via a well-functioning
electricity market in order to minimize integration costs, which must
be safeguarded by increased policy efforts to establish a level playing
field, improve the electricity market design and adjust support schemes
to minimize distortions. Many barriers to market integration still exist to
date. Although they can relate to a broader context that covers multiple
dimensions (e.g. technological, institutional, political, and societal) (see
e.g. 72,73,77,78), barriers related to the market design per se are of
particular importance. As "the set of arrangements which govern how
market actors generate, trade, supply and consume electricity and use
the electricity infrastructure” [39], the market design plays a central role
in determining market functioning. Market functioning also depends on
multiple policy and regulation schemes most relevant to the electrical
power sector at EU and MS level, such as carbon pricing under the
1 Integration costs (Cint) can be formally defined as additional costs in the residual
system for serving the same amount of residual electricity demand (Eresid = Etot-EVRE)
after VRE introduction, in comparison to a benchmarking conventional system without
VRE: Cint = Cresid-(Ctot,conv/Etot)*Eresid. The residual system costs equal total system costs
minus VRE generation costs: Cresid = Ctot-CVRE, which include life-cycle (fixed and
variable) costs for non-VRE plants, balancing services, grid infrastructure and storage
[118]. The concept of integration costs and its decomposition will be further discussed in
Chapter 4.
2 Market revenue risks include price risk due to uncertain electricity price, volume risk
due to uncertain sale volume and balancing risk due to penalty for deviations from
schedule [128].
3 Due to very low marginal costs, VRE is normally dispatched in priority based on the
merit order. However, priority dispatch here refers to the situation of VRE being
dispatched with no or less respect to its marginal costs and price signals. Priority
dispatch can be distinguished into two types: explicit physical priority dispatch (i.e.
obligations of system operators to dispatch VRE ahead of any other generators) and
implicit financial priority dispatch (i.e. subsidies that enable VRE to bid and accept a
price below its marginal costs). Both can undermine operational efficiency and exacer-
bate system stress events, e.g. negative price periods when minimum must-run
generation level is reached [6].
4 Balancing responsibilities for VRE can be fully exempted (e.g. under feed-in tariff
schemes in Germany and Croatia) or largely exempted (e.g. a tolerance marginal for
imbalances exists for offshore wind in Belgium) [31].
5 “Efficiency” will appear many times in this paper in different terms, such as
operational efficiency, allocative efficiency, efficiency of trading behaviors and price
efficiency. It should be noted that they all relate to integration costs, because they reflect
different aspects of the electricity market's ability in reducing integration costs.
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European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and VRE support
schemes. The existence of ill-designed market design elements and
policy schemes in the current EU electricity market can give rise to
market inefficiencies. They undermine proper market functioning,
meaning that they either hinder efficient operation or reduce the
feasibility of business cases for investments in VRE and/or complement-
ing flexible resources. Therefore, these design elements and policy
schemes directly act as barriers for market integration (hereafter
referred to as “market integration barriers”), which also increase
integration costs. They are the focus of this paper.
Market integration barriers have been widely reported in literature,
but in a fragmented manner. For instance, Scharff and Amelin [112]
analyze the negative impacts of market design elements on efficient
trading behaviors in the ELBAS
6 continuous trading intraday market.
Both Musgens et al. [93] and Hirth and Ziegenhagen [67] report
potentially inefficient market designs in the German balancing market,
regarding the price settlement rule and the scoring rule. Hiroux and
Saguan [62] assessed a limited number of market design options
affecting integration costs, regarding the gate closure time of the
intraday market, system types of the imbalance settlement and the
locational marginal pricing mechanism. Oliveira [99] analytically
demonstrated that inefficiencies arising from feed-in VRE support
schemes can increase integration costs. To date, however, a framework
combining all factors that influence VRE market integration and the
general functioning of the electricity market, is still lacking. To fill this
gap, this review paper aims to develop a comprehensive framework
that incorporates the most pertinent market integration barriers that
increase integration costs and resulting inefficiencies. This framework
mainly assesses the market integration of large-scale VRE generations,
but it is also relevant to small-scale distributed VRE generation. Since
distributed VRE generation can participate in the electricity market
through smart grid and the role of aggregator, removing market
integration barriers is also important to them. The developed frame-
work is supposed to inform policy-makers what market design
elements and policy schemes act as market integration barriers.
Accordingly, suggestions are given for the redesign of the EU electricity
market which aim to improve market functioning and safeguard VRE
market integration. This paper provides value-added insights that
contribute to facilitate the low-carbon transition of the EU's power
sector in a cost-efficient manner. Lessons can also be drawn for
countries that plan to decarbonize and liberalize their electric power
sector concurrently.
2. Method
Given that the market integration of VRE by definition is to minimize
integration costs via a well-functioning electricity market, the framework
can be developed through relating different dimensions of the electricity
market design and relevant policy schemes to integration costs. To achieve
this end, a literature review was performed. Because our aim was to
comprehensively include literature from different fields that are related to
the electricity market design and VRE market integration, we did not take
a specific view to select and assess literature. This means an explorative
research approach was taken.
The detailed approach for developing the framework consists of
four steps:
Step 1: Characterizing the EU electricity market design per
submarket.
In this step, the set-up of the current EU electricity market and the
function of each submarket were briefly described. Then key market
design elements per submarket were characterized. The characteriza-
tion focused on five common dimensions, including.
• Trading products
• Price settlement rule
• System type
• Time resolution of trading products
• Gate closure time
Step 2: Integration costs and its allocation per submarket.
In the second step, the concept of integration costs was reviewed,
following Ueckerdt et al. [118] and Hirth et al. [65]. This laid the
theoretical foundation of this paper. Based on their theoretical frame-
work, integration costs were decomposed and allocated to each
submarket of the electricity market. Accordingly, a contour of the
framework comprising several blocks was sketched, with each block
representing a specific submarket.
Step 3: Identifying potential barriers per submarket.
Following the contour developed in step 2, potential market
integration barriers that increase integration costs for each submarket
were identified. This step was conducted on the basis of a comprehen-
sive review of literature. The main focus was key design elements per
submarket characterized in step 1. Besides, existing policy and regula-
tions schemes at EU and Member State (MS) level that are important to
the functioning of electricity market were also looked into, including:
• Carbon pricing under the EU ETS scheme to internalize the climate
externality
• Feed-in support schemes for VRE investments
• Price-cap regulation to prevent market power
• Regulation and/or subsidies to retain baseload capacity for security
of supply
Step 4: Synthesis, policy recommendations and further research.
In this step the framework was accomplished, highlighting each
barrier, their relationship with other barriers, and resulting inefficien-
cies. Based on the synthesis, recommendations were given regarding
how to improve the functioning of the current EU electricity market in
order to facilitate successful market integration of VRE. Furthermore,
suggestions for further research were also provided for academic
researchers.
The outcomes of each method step are presented in Chapter 3–6.
3. Characterizing the EU electricity market design per
submarket
Grid stability requires maintaining balance of active power between
supply and demand in real-time [115,76]. The electricity market
should meet this requirement while respecting multiple constraints
in generation capacity, flexibility, transmission, storage and demand
elasticity [111,115,126,62]. This determines the set-up of the electri-
city market, which involves different submarkets with complementing
functions to allocate resources and offer different trading opportu-
nities. In the EU, the electricity market typically consists of a day-ahead
(DA) spot market, an intraday (ID) market, a balancing (BA) market
and an imbalance settlement [111]. In parallel to these submarkets, a
locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanism exists to represent grid
constraints [62,76]. Fig. 1 shows an illustrative example of the typical
set-up of the EU electricity market. We will now briefly discuss each
submarket and their main functions. This serves as the basis for the
characterization of market design and later identification of market
integration barriers per submarket.
3.1. Day-ahead spot market
The DA spot market is used to trade hourly electricity products in
wholesale for the following day. A uniform DA spot price (measured in
€/MWh) is set by short-run marginal costs (SRMC)-based bids (i.e.
uniform marginal pricing), if the market is able to clear. If the market
6 ELBAS is the joint intraday market for Nordic countries, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia,
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany [112]
J. Hu et al. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 81 (2018) 2181–2195
2183
fails to clear due to insufficient generation capacity to meet demand,
the spot price is called scarcity price. Scarcity price in principle
should be set at the value of lost load (VOLL), which represents an
average consumer's willingness to pay to avoid the involuntary curtail-
ment of electricity consumption [115,76]. It is also approximately
equal to the marginal costs of offering one additional unit of electricity
(measured in €/MWh). The gate closure of DA trading is typically
12:00 pm day-ahead [111]. Bid-winning participants need to commit
themselves to ex-ante operational scheduling for power generation or
consumption on an hourly (e.g. Spain) or half-hourly (e.g. France,
Ireland, UK) or quarter-hourly (e.g. Belgium, Netherlands, Germany,
Austria, Poland) basis [83,111,95,48]. They also need to assign
themselves to one balancing responsible party (BRP), which is finan-
cially accountable for the real-time net imbalance from DA commit-
ment of the portfolio of generation and/or consumption it manages
[67].
3.2. Intraday market
ID market allows BRPs to obtain a better balanced position based
on updated information after the gate closure of DA market [111]. It
offers flexibility to reduce the need for more expensive resources with
high flexibility for real-time balancing [112,126]. ID trading system can
be either based on discrete auctions (e.g. Spain, Italy, and Portugal) or
continuous trading (e.g. Nordic countries, Netherlands and Belgium).
In continuous trading, bids and offers are not matched at the same time
but based on “first-come first serve” principle, implying that the price
settlement is based on “pay-as-bid” [111]. This also leads to varying
prices for the same delivery time [96]. By contrast, discrete auctions
aggregate all bids and offers within each trading period in one single
auction [111]. The price settlement for each auction is based on
uniform marginal pricing, which is similar to the DA trading [111].
Both continuous trading and discrete auctions typically trade hourly
electricity products, while quarter-hourly electricity products are also
possible to trade in continuous trading [96]. The gate closure times for
continuous trading and discrete auctions are currently 5–60 min and
135–690 min before delivery [100,58].
3.3. Balancing market
Due to remaining uncertainties between ID gate closure and real-
time delivery and sub-hourly variability, a BA market is established by
the transmission system operator (TSO) for the reservation and
activation of balancing capacity from balancing service providers
(BSPs). BSPs have to commit themselves at a certain generation level
in the DA spot market, so that they can ramp up or down in case of
being called to provide balancing energy [11]. The TSO determines the
size of balancing capacity needed with pre-defined requirements (e.g.
contract duration, activation timeframe, ramp rates) and procures
them in advance through an auction [67]. The auction consists of a
capacity price bid (€/MW•h of capacity product7) for capacity reserva-
tion and an energy price bid (€/MWh of energy product) for capacity
activation [67,93]. Both capacity price and energy price can be
determined via pay-as-bid or uniform pricing. Under uniform pricing,
the price can be set by either marginal costs or average costs [111]. In
the case of the system being short, activated upward reserves receive
the energy price being the result of the bid, while in the case of the
system being long, activated downward reserves pay the energy price
due to saved operating costs [15]. The energy price in the BA market
can become negative if downward balancing capacity is in scarcity. The
time resolution ranges from yearly to hourly for capacity products, and
from hourly to quarter-hourly for energy products [48]. As for gate
closure time, it ranges from year-ahead to day-ahead before delivery for
capacity products, and from hour-ahead to quarter-hour ahead before
delivery for energy products [48].
3.4. Imbalance settlement
IB settlement is used to allocate ex-post the costs associated with
the reservation and activation of balancing capacity in the BA market to
imbalanced BRPs that deviate from their DA commitments. In practice,
an IB settlement price mainly consists of the energy price for the
activation of balancing capacity in the BA market [22]. Therefore,
trading product in the IB settlement is the imbalanced energy between
a BRP's real-time delivery and its DA commitment. The time resolution
(or settlement period) of the IB settlement and its trading products is
consistent with that of the BRP's DA commitment, i.e. ranging from
hourly to quarter-hourly [48,52]. Sometimes the settlement price also
includes a multiplicative (e.g. Belgium, France) or additive punitive
component (e.g. Germany) to strengthen incentives for BRPs to reduce
own imbalances [120,121]. Using the DA spot price as a reference, the
IB settlement price tends to be higher for upward balancing (in the case
of the system being short) and lower for downward balancing (in the
case of the system being long). The IB settlement can be either based
on a one-price system (e.g. Germany, Spain) or a two-price system (e.g.
France, Italy) [105]. Table 1 (adapted from Scharff [111]) shows the
economic outcome for BRPs with different positions in respect of
system imbalance under a one-price system and a two-price system. In
both systems, short BRPs pay while long BRPs get paid. The difference
is that in the one-price system the same IB price applies to both BRPs
counteracting and aggravating system imbalance. By contrast, two
Fig. 1. Illustrative set-up of the EU electricity market.
7 The capacity product refers to the commitment of reserving a maximum amount of
balancing capacity for a specific duration of time. Therefore, it is measured in MW•h.
This is different from the energy product measured in MWh. The latter is the total
electricity output associated with the actual activation of balancing capacity.
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respective price signals (i.e. system imbalance price and DA price) exist
in the two-price system for BRPs aggravating and counteracting system
imbalance [111,121]. Because of the opportunity costs implied in the
spread between the IB price signal and the DA spot price, the two-price
system discourages BRPs of any deviations from their DA commit-
ments. However, in the one-price system, BRPs with own imbalance to
the opposite direction of system imbalance (i.e. passive balancing) are
rewarded.
3.5. Locational marginal pricing mechanism
The LMP mechanism is used in the electricity market to represent
grid constraints at different locations on the electricity network, in
order to efficiently use the transmission capacity as a scarce good.
Electricity prices at two different locations are the same if there is
sufficient transmission capacity (i.e. market coupling). However, loca-
tional electricity prices differ if grid congestion occurs between the two
locations (i.e. market splitting). Depending on the level of details for
grid constraint representation, LMP mechanism can be based on a
nodal pricing system (e.g. Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM)
interconnection in US) or a zonal pricing system (e.g. most Member
States in EU) [94]. Nodal pricing represents the grid transmission
capacity at each node of the power system. By contrast, zonal pricing
only takes into account the capacity of interconnector between two
different price zones, without representing the constraints within each
zone.
3.6. Market design characterization
Based on the above descriptions, it is possible to characterize the
electricity market design per submarket according to the five key
dimensions. The characterization results are shown in Table 2.
4. Integration costs and its allocation per submarket
Integration costs are additional costs in the residual system
resulting from the interaction between VRE, featuring variable, un-
certain and locational-dependent outputs, and the residual system
[65]. For accounting purpose, integration costs can be attributed to the
addition of VRE into power system and measured in terms of specific
costs (€/MWhVRE) [113]. However, integration costs are often not
directly borne by VRE generators, in absence of sufficient market
exposure and cost-reflective price signals, e.g. under feed-in tariff
scheme. This implies that integration costs will be socialized (e.g. to
end-users), if they are incompletely internalized in the electricity
market [110,65].
The definition and accounting of integration costs may differ
between authors, depending on the system boundary, the techno-
economic features of existing power system and the assumptions
regarding future scenario (e.g. technology mix and cost, demand
elasticity, system adaptation) [5]. Ueckerdt et al., [118] and Hirth
et al. [65] establish a wide-cited standard theoretical framework, based
on welfare economics, to account and conceptualize integration costs.
This paper follows Ueckerdt et al. [118] and Hirth et al. [65].
The constraints of storage, plant flexibility and grid make electricity
a heterogeneous commodity with varying economic values across time,
delivery lead time and location [66]. This means that VRE cannot
directly serve electricity load due to their mismatch across time,
delivery lead time and location. Hence, integration costs can either
be interpreted as additional costs of accommodating VRE to enable it
to serve load, or equivalently, the marginal value reduction of VRE in
comparison to a benchmarking power generator perfectly matching
load [118,65]. Following the variable, uncertain and locational-depen-
dent nature of VRE, Hirth et al. [65] decomposes integration costs into
three components, namely profile costs, balancing costs and grid costs.
Profile costs result from the temporal profile mismatch between VRE
output and the load. They can be regarded as diminishing cost saving
from the substitution of VRE to electricity generation from thermal
plants. This is because the use of VRE to serve load involves necessary
adjustments of scheduled operation and utilization of thermal plants in
the residual system, i.e. increased ramping, cycling, partial-load
operations and reduced utilization hours. These adjustments cause
additional costs, which decrease the value (i.e. cost saving) that VRE
brings to the power system. Therefore, profile costs can also be
interpreted as the increase in opportunity costs from the usage of
VRE. Balancing costs represent additional expenses for balancing the
deviation of VRE outputs from scheduled operation (i.e. forecast
errors) because of uncertain VRE outputs. Grid costs refer to cost
associated with grid infrastructure investment and management due to
locational-dependent siting of VRE resources [65].
The three components of integration costs (profile costs, balancing
costs and grid costs) can be allocated to different submarkets, based on
the function per submarket. Profile costs can be reflected in the
reduced market value (i.e. market revenue) of VRE from a benchmark-
ing power generator with perfect temporal coincidence to the load,
which is the difference between load-weighted spot price and VRE
output-weighted spot price across time; balancing costs can be
reflected in the increased costs associated with balancing services in
the ID market and BA market, as well as the price signals to financially
settle these costs in the IB settlement; grid costs can be reflected in the
price spread between different locations in the LMP mechanism [65].
The three types of system integration costs also give rise to three
categories of barriers hampering the progress of market integration:
barriers increasing 1) profile costs, 2) balancing costs, and 3) grid costs.
Table 1
IB settlement under a one-price system and a two-price system PDA, Pup and Pdown respectively denote DA spot price, IB price for upward balancing and IB price for downward balancing.
Eshort and Elong represent the amount of energies that deviates from DA commitment for BRPs that are short and long, respectively. The green color indicates the IB price is more
beneficial for BRPs with respect to the DA spot price, while the red color implies the opposite.
Source: Adapted from Scharff [111]
One-price system System/BRP position System short (upward balancing) System in balance (no balancing) System long (downward balancing)
Short BRP Pay: Pup*Eshort Pay: PDA*Eshort Pay: Pdown*Eshort
Net loss: Net: 0 Net gain:
(Pup –PDA) *Eshort (PDA –Pdown) *Eshort
Long BRP Receive: Pup*Elong Receive: PDA*Elong Receive: Pdown*Elong
Net gain: Net: 0 Net loss:
(Pup –PDA) *Elong (PDA –Pdown) *Elong
Two-price system System short (Up-regulation) System short (upward balancing) System in balance (no regulation) System long (downward balancing)
Short BRP Pay: Pup*Eshort Pay: PDA*Eshort Pay: PDA*Eshort
Net loss: Net: 0 Net: 0
(Pup –PDA) *Eshort
Long BRP Receive: PDA*Elong Receive: PDA*Elong Receive: Pdown*Elong
Net: 0 Net: 0 Net loss:
(PDA – Pdown) * Elong
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These barriers can be respectively traced back to certain market design
elements per submarket and relevant policy schemes. They either
undermine efficient market operation, or reduce the feasibility of
business cases for VRE and/or complementing flexible resources.
Accordingly, an empty contour of the framework can be drawn, as
shown in Fig. 2.
5. Identifying potential barriers per submarket
Via filling the contour set up in chapter 4, the following sections
respectively present identified potential barriers increasing profile costs
in the DA spot market (5.1), increasing balancing costs in the ID
market, BA market and IB settlement (5.2), and increasing grid costs in
the LMP mechanism (5.3):
5.1. Potential barriers increasing profile costs in the DA spot market
Profile costs rise with increased penetration of VRE. They are
mirrored in market value (i.e. market revenue) reduction of VRE, being
equaled to the VRE output-weighted spot prices over time
(€/MWhVRE) [65,72]. This can be explained by two factors. Firstly,
rising VRE penetration reduces the temporary profile correlation
between VRE and load, implying that it is less likely for VRE at high
penetrations to benefit from high spot prices during scarcity periods8
[11]. Secondly, because the price settlement is based on uniform
marginal pricing, VRE with close-to-zero SRMC is usually dis-
patched in priority and replaces electricity generated by the marginal
thermal plants that set the spot price. This shifts the supply curve to the
right and causes a tendency of lower spot prices when VRE generates
[24]. Consequently, both the average spot price and the market value of
VRE decrease with the increased penetration of VRE, and the market
value of VRE decreases faster, ceteris paribus. Clearly, the diminished
market value of VRE reduces the feasibility of the business case for
VRE investments, when the spot price becomes the sole revenue source
[78]. Empirical econometric analyses have indicated a correlation
between the increased penetration of VRE and the decreased average
spot price in many EU Member States, such as Austria [128], Germany
[128,26], Italy [25] and Spain [108]. The reduced average spot price,
compounded by the increased levelized costs of electricity generation
(LCOE) due to reduced utilization hours, also endangers the business
case for flexible gas-fired peak load and mid-merit plants. These plants
are considered important back-up plants when VRE does not generate.
It is reported that in Europe over 20 GW gas-fired plants were
mothballed in 2013 and this figure could increase to 110 GW by
2017 [117]. Although a DA market based on uniform marginal pricing
is well-known in promoting short-term operational efficiency, a few
studies, e.g. De Castro et al. [28]; EC [42]; Agora Energiewende [4],
have given concerns over its ability to guarantee long-term market
efficiency that foster and remunerate investments in VRE and com-
plementing flexible resources, when VRE with close-to-zero SRMC
becomes prevalent and regularly sets the spot price. These concerns
seem to be plausible, but often they neglect the fact that the spot price
is the result of the supply-demand dynamics and VRE is only one factor
that affects such dynamics.
As of today, the current low spot price in Europe is also attributed




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 At very low (≤2%) and low (≤5%) penetration of VRE, a positive correlation may
exist between the temporal profile of VRE and peak load, varying from different power
systems. For instance, in countries with a hot climate, solar outputs may coincide with
the summer peak load at noon due to the use of air conditioning for cooling. A similar
case is for wind outputs in countries with a cold climate, where the winter peak load
occurs in the windy evening after sunset [5]. These can have an uplifting effect on the
market value of VRE. However, as the penetration of VRE further increases, the initial
peak load will be inevitably shaved and finally become the valley.
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• The persistent weak carbon price under the EU ETS, which
oscillated between 6.4 and 8.6 €/Tonne CO2 in 2015 [44], is insufficient
to internalize the climate externality and associated SCC [70].
• Due to overly-stringent security of supply or grid reliability stan-
dards regardless of its costs, regulation and retroactive sub-
sidies (e.g. capacity payment) for retaining inflexible
baseload capacity result in overcapacity [12,87,109].
Exacerbated by the large addition of VRE capacity driven by support
policy schemes, the post-recession flat/declining electricity demand
and the neglect of demand response potentials [7,84], overcapacity
eliminates the occurrence of scarcity price that are essential to
recover capital costs of investments in all types of generation
capacity including VRE and flexible resources. For instance, the
scarcity price never occurred in Germany in 2014 [30].
• Even if a scarcity situation occurs, price-cap regulation or technical
requirement of power exchange can limit the scarcity price to a
level well-below the VOLL [53]. The price cap currently ranges
from 150 to 3000 Euro/MWh in Europe [54]. In presence of such a
low price cap, the scarcity price is insufficient to remunerate
investments in VRE and complementing flexible resources.
These policy and regulation schemes depress the market value of
VRE, leading to higher profile costs. In addition, they blur the price
formation in the DA spot market, undermining investment incentives
included in market price signals.
The reduction of VREmarket value (or the increase of profile costs) and
the average spot price can be partly, if not fully, mitigated through a few
measures that aim to increase the spot price when VRE generates.9 These
measures mainly include flexible resources (i.e. flexible thermal plants,
energy storage, demand response), system-friendly VRE technologies and
arrangements (i.e. high power density wind turbine, solar panel with
unconventional orientation), inter-regional integration of electricity market
through market coupling, increasing the carbon price, accelerating the
phase-out of the overcapacity of inflexible baseload plants, and increasing
the price cap to the VOLL [42,59,63,64,72,78,85,97]. They in general have
an uplifting effect on the spot price when VRE generates, either through 1)
shift the supply curve left, or 2) increase residual demand,10 or 3) increase
the average height of the supply curve, or 4) smooth the temporal profile of
VRE output, or 5) strengthening scarcity price. Therefore, through a
synergy of these measures, it seems possible to avoid the situation of spot
prices being regularly set by VRE. Even at high penetrations of VRE, spot
prices could be restored to a sufficiently high level to stimulate investments
in VRE and complementing flexible resources. However, to effectively
scale-up the implementation of these measures, many barriers are yet to be
overcome. Table 3 summarizes different measures limiting the reduction of
VRE market value and the increase of profile costs, their mechanisms and
potential barriers hindering their implementation. It may take time to fully
overcome these barriers. This implies that alongside the progress of
implementing these measures, support policy schemes for VRE invest-
ments are still needed, at least in the medium term, since the market
revenue alone is insufficient to recoup the high capital costs.
Current, Feed-in support schemes in the form of either tariffs or
premiums that remunerate VRE on the basis of per unit of electricity
generation are most commonly used in the majority of EU Member
States [79]. Fig. 3 shows different types of feed-in schemes, with each
type being briefly described.
In general, these schemes enable VRE generators to largely feed in
electricity at very low or negative spot price that is below their close-to-
zero SRMC [6,20,86]. Therefore, they lead to reduced market value of
VRE and unnecessarily higher profile costs. The extent to which they are
market-based differs, as these feed-in schemes expose VRE to the price
signal (and thus the market revenue risks) at different levels in the DA
spot market. Depending on their market-based level, feed-in schemes also
give rise to different levels of market distortions [45,49,10]. As the
dominant support policy scheme that steers past VRE investments in
the EU, feed-in tariff has been introduced in 17 out of the 28 Member
States till 2014 [79]. However, a feed-in tariff fully shields VRE against
market price signals, discouraging developers from adopting more
system-friendly technologies and arrangements and selecting generation
sites that maximize the market value (i.e. market revenue) of VRE.
Consequently, the EC has called for more market-based feed-in premiums
to progressively replace feed-in tariffs, stating that feed-in premiums can
“put pressure on renewable energy generators to become more active
market participants, via incentives to optimise investments, plant design
and operation according to market signals” [35]. It will prohibit the use of
feed-in tariffs to support new VRE installations from 2016 onwards, and
as of then it is obliged for all Member States to use feed-in premiums (in
combination with tenders and the removal of subsidies during negative
price periods) for the sake of better market integration [37]. Among all
feed-in premiums, fixed feed-in premiums are deemed as the most
market-based and thus have the least distorting impacts on the DA spot
market. However, using an analytical model with empirical data, Oliveira
Fig. 2. Contour of the framework development.
9 Note that some of these measures (e.g. interconnector, demand response) can also
lower the spot price when VRE does not generate or generate less. Therefore, their
impact on the average spot price might be limited.
10 The residual demand is defined as the demand net the output of VRE, which treats
VRE as “must-take” generation
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[99] has demonstrated that even in the case of fixed feed-in schemes,
perverse incentives that deviate from the objective of market value
maximization always exist for firms that own both VRE generators and
thermal generators. As for firms that only own VRE generators, these
perverse incentives can still exist if the convexity of the supply curve is
high [99]. As such, it seems reasonable to conclude that all feed-in
schemes can disincentivize VRE generators to maximize their market
value and act as a barrier that increases profile costs. Fig. 4 shows that due
to the use of feed-in schemes, VRE investments may be locked in a vicious
cycle of subsidy-dependent pathway. Feed-in schemes enlarge the gap
between the investment costs of VRE and its market value, which in turn
increase the subsidy level needed from feed-in schemes to make VRE
investments break-even. In other words, feed-in schemes may inefficiently
increase their own policy costs. If such policy costs become unaffordable,
it can increase the risk of subsidy termination. Therefore, the authors
argue that feed-in schemes are inconsistent with the objective of market
integration.11
The gate closure time and the time resolution of trading
products of the DA spot market also affect the market efficiency.
Although not directly influencing profile costs, these two design
elements have cross-market impact on balancing costs that occur in
the ID market, BA market and IB settlement via influencing the
demand for system balancing services [56].
The current gate closure time for the EU DA spot market is typically
12:00 P.M. day-ahead. It is criticized for being too far from the real-
time delivery in the following day [12]. In particular, a delivery lead
time as long as 36 h exists for the last hour of the following day. The
large forecast errors associated with such long lead time tends to put
VRE generators at a more imbalanced position in real time, increasing
the overall system demand for balancing resources in the ID market
and BA market and the associated balancing costs [85]. Due to large
uncertainties and balancing risks, the early gate closure time also
creates an unfavorable condition for VRE generators to submit bids in
the DA spot market [108]. This can be detrimental to the business case
of VRE investments and the process of market integration.
Since hourly electricity products are traded in the DA market, the
corresponding DA spot price is also determined on an hourly resolu-
tion. However, the spot price with hourly resolution, as an averaged
indicator, cannot accurately reflect the physical reality of supply-
demand dynamics that is usually scheduled at a sub-hourly resolution
[85]. This is particularly the case for VRE supply, whose sub-hourly
variability can be significant [88]. Hence, the correlation can be very
low between hourly spot prices and sub-hourly IB prices for the same
Table 3
Measures limiting VRE market value reduction and their barriers.
Source: Buck et al. [16]; de Jong et al. [30]; Papaefthymiou et al. [102]; Zane et al. [128]; Auer [8]; THEMA [116]; Deutsch et al. [32]; Hu et al. [70]; ENTSO-E [47]; He et al. [60]; Hirth
and Muller [63].
Measures limiting VRE market value reduction and
profile costs increase
Mechanism Potential barriers
Flexible resources Flexible thermal plants (with
low minimum load)
Shift the supply curve leftwards High capital costs;
Unsound business cases due to the lack of scarcity price
Energy storage Increase the residual demand High capital costs;
Life degradation and fatigue due to cycling (in the case of battery);
Unsound business cases due to the lack of scarcity price
Interconnector Increase the residual demand Lack of coordination between the development of grid and VRE;
Lack of investment incentive for TSOs;
Fragmentation of individual regional TSOs;
Public acceptance of overhead lines
Demand response Increase the residual demand Lack of adequate ICT infrastructure;
Lack of real-time pricing;
Segmentation of consumer groups with different price elasticities of
demand within one household;




High power density wind
turbine





Smooth the temporal profile of
VRE output
N.A.
Inter-regional integration of electricity market through market
coupling
Smooth the temporal profile of
VRE output
Lack of interconnector infrastructure;
Fragmentation of individual regional TSOs;
Political resistance from national governments due to loss of sovereignty
Increase the carbon price Increase the overall height of the
supply curve
Carbon price sufficiently high to steer VRE investments is likely to face
political unacceptance in the short and medium run due to concerns over
industrial competitiveness and carbon leakage;
Incompatible policy designs that have a depressing impact on the carbon
price;
Accelerate the phase-out of the overcapacity of inflexible baseload
plants
Shift the supply curve leftwards;
strengthening scarcity pricing
Retroactive capacity payments for retaining coal-fired baseload plants (e.
g. UK, Spain);
(Explicit and implicit) subsidies for fossil fuels;
Market-exit restrictions;
Overly stringent security of supply standard
Lift up price cap to the VOLL Strengthening scarcity pricing Lack of risk hedging products for price spikes;
Public and political unacceptance
11 It should also be stressed that in absence of other more market-compatible support
measures and in the context of still existing fossil subsidies and the incomplete
internalization of climate externalities, the removal of feed-in schemes is obviously not
a good idea.
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period, which encourages strategic behavior of BRPs to arbitrage
between the price differences through deliberately maintaining an
imbalanced position [83,95]. This results in higher system needs for
balancing services and higher balancing costs. Inefficiencies associated
with the low time resolution of trading products in the DA spot market
will be further discussed in Section 5.2.3.
5.2. Potential barriers increasing balancing costs in the ID market,
BA market and IB settlement
5.2.1. Potential barriers increasing balancing costs in the ID market
To avoid the use of more expensive real-time balancing capacities,
the ID market alongside updated information should be used to the
largest extent to reduce imbalances and associated balancing costs
[126]. However, illiquidity, mirrored by low trading volumes, often
characterizes the ID market in Europe, resulting in inefficient perfor-
mance in terms of resources allocation and limiting balancing costs
[112,126,21,23]. Multiple factors contribute to an illiquid ID market:
• Due to market concentration, market participants with large
generation portfolios tend to net out own imbalances through
internal balancing rather than ID trading [126].
• Clear preference of market participants to trade close to gate closure
time of the ID market because of more accurate forecasts [112]
suggests that a gate closure time insufficient close to real-
time ( > 60 min before delivery) may undermine liquidity.
This can be relevant for Spain, Italy and Portugal, where ID gate
closure times range from 135 to 690 min before delivery.
• Limited participation of demand response due to tight
access rules and difficulty to develop baseline and measure
compliance [14,6].
• Illiquidity can increase the transaction costs of market
participants because it is likely that their purchases and/or sales
move the market price and reduce the benefits from trading. The
fear of such transition costs in turn exacerbates illiquidity [126].
Liquidity also hinges on whether the system type of the ID is based
on discrete auctions or continuous trading. Discrete auctions
aggregate all bids and offers within each trading period in one auction,
and thus show better liquidity performance [112,23]. By contrast, the
large price variance from trade-to-trade in continuous trading disin-
centivizes market participants to trade. In addition, unlike uniform
marginal pricing used in discrete auctions, the price settlement rule of
continuous trading based on “first come first serve” pay-as-bid is
inefficient by nature, because more expensive bids can be accepted if
less expensive bids come later [111,96]. Scharff and Amelin [112] also
report that transaction costs in terms of ICT system and trading staff
costs are often involved in continuous trading because of the need to
monitor the market constantly to identify more lucrative prices. Thus,
continuous trading can be deemed as an inefficient design element for
limiting balancing costs.
In addition, liquidity of the ID market is affected by interactions
and interdependencies with the BA market and IB settlement. Weber
[126] argues that since BSPs in the BA market have already earned a
capacity price for capacity reservation, they may have incentives to
offer energy price bids lower than their true costs for capacity
activation. This can lower the energy price for balancing energy, which
finally turns into a lower IB price. If the resulting IB price is lower than
Fig. 3. Different types of feed-in schemes and their brief descriptions. Compiled based on CEER [20]; Noothoot et al. [98]; Huntington et al. [71].
Fig. 4. Subsidy-dependent pathway for VRE investments.
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the ID price, VRE generators and other market participants will have
less incentive to reduce their own imbalances through trading in the ID
market [126]. This, however, is not an issue, if the price settlement rule
for both the capacity price bid for capacity reservation and the energy
price bid for capacity activation are based on uniform marginal pricing.
Musgens et al. [93] has theoretically demonstrated that, under uniform
marginal pricing, rational bidders in competitive markets will disclose
their true costs for capacity reservation and capacity activation. To be
more specific, the capacity price bid will be equal to the expected
opportunity costs from capacity reservation net the expected profits
from capacity activation, while the energy price bid will be equal to the
SRMC of providing balancing energy [93]. Nevertheless, in many EU
countries pay-as-bid (e.g. Germany, Italy) instead of uniform mar-
ginal pricing is currently used as price settlement rule for the BA
market, which may contribute to the low liquidity of the ID market.
Liquidity of the ID market is also dependent on the system type of the
IB settlement, i.e. based on a one-price system or a two-price system
[112,126]. As passive balancing is rewarded in a one-price system,
BRPs may strategically maintain an imbalanced position. This can
reduce the liquidity of the ID market. Scharff and Amelin [112] further
illustrates that compared with a two-price system, ID trading
is less reciprocal for both risk-averse sellers and buyers
under a one-price system. Therefore, it can be suggested that the
liquidity performance is better when the ID market is combined with
the IB settlement based on a two-price system. However, the better
liquidity performance will be undermined if an inefficient multi-
plicative punitive component is introduced under a two-price
system that asymmetrically penalizes short BRPs more than long BRPs,
which is, for example, the case in France and Spain [120,52]. In that
case, BRPs including independent VRE generators tend to under-
contract or withholding own balancing resources to avoid being short,
which may reduce incentives for ID trading.
5.2.2. Potential barriers increasing balancing costs in the BA market
The overall efficiency of the BA market depends largely on the price
settlement rule used for capacity reservation (via capacity price bid per
MW·h) and activation (via energy price bid per MWh). A general consensus
is that pay-as-bid (e.g. Germany, Italy) is inefficient for limiting balancing
costs, compared with uniform marginal pricing [15,67]. As pay-as-bid
rewards BSPs best at guessing the clearing price, it does not necessarily
accept balancing capacities with least costs [27]. Musgens et al. [93] have
demonstrated that both price settlement rules are equivalent under
complete information and perfect competition. However, pay-as-bid shows
inferiority under imperfect competition and incomplete information in
terms of efficiency, transparency and transaction costs.
The low time resolution (e.g. yearly, weekly, daily and four-
hourly) and very early gate closure time before delivery (e.g.
week-ahead) for capacity products of balancing services also reduce
the efficiency of the BA market, resulting in unnecessarily higher balancing
costs. Balancing service provision involves opportunity costs for thermal
plants, because these plants have to commit themselves at a certain
generation level in the DA spot market in case of being called. The
opportunity costs mainly consist of missed income or imposed losses in the
DA market [67,93]. For upward balancing, Just [82]; Musgens et al. [92]
have qualitatively demonstrated that efficient balancing services should be
provided by thermal plants with SRMC close to the DA spot price, which
leads to lowest opportunity costs and thus lowest system balancing costs.
This means that the capacity mix for providing efficient balancing services
changes over time, due to varying spot prices. Therefore, a low time
resolution of capacity products can give rise to inefficiencies, because it fixes
the same balancing capacity mix for a time period with varying hourly spot
prices. Similarly, an early gate closure time for capacity products far away
from delivery also leads to inefficiencies due to fixing the balancing capacity
mix at a specific time when uncertainty of the spot price is high [82,92]. As
for downward balancing services, Hirth and Ziegenhagen [67] have
illustrated that they can be efficiently provided by VRE generators,
featuring close-to-zero SRMC, at zero opportunities costs. This also reduces
the must-run generation level resulting from the use of thermal plants to
provide these services. As shown by a fewmodelling-based studies and pilot
projects [55,57,67,124], the technical reliability of balancing services
provided by wind farms pooling over a large geographical area is
sufficiently high, under hourly time resolution of capacity products and
gate closure time one hour-ahead delivery. However, a low time resolution
of capacity products and very early gate closure time before delivery create
an entry barrier12 and biased conditions for VRE to participate in the BA
market [123,52,67,92]. For instance, in Germany and Belgium, balancing
services require a resolution of capacity products ranging from weekly to
four-hourly, and the procurement of these services is usually week-ahead or
day-ahead [124,67]. Under these conditions, the weather forecasts are too
uncertain for VRE to provide reliable balancing services [52,67].
Consequently, these biased contract conditions reduce potential revenue
streams for VRE, which is detrimental to the business case of VRE
investments.
In addition, Borggrefe and Neuhoff [14] point out the lack of
joint-optimization between BA market and other submar-
kets also increases balancing costs. The current electricity market
design in most EU countries requires power generators exclusively
commit themselves either in the DA/ID markets trading energy
products or BA market trading capacity products. This eliminates the
possibility to contract capacity products for the same hour from power
plants that have scheduled to decrease electricity outputs in the DA/ID
energy submarkets through partial-load operation, even if upward
balancing services provided by these partial-load plants can reduce the
overall balancing costs [14].
5.2.3. Potential barriers increasing balancing costs in the IB settlement
IB settlement not only allocates balancing costs to imbalanced BRPs,
but signals the price of imbalance from DA commitments. Hence, the price
settlement rule affects the overall efficiency of the IB settlement for limiting
balancing costs. Depending on whether uniform marginal pricing or pay-
as-bid is used in the BA market, IB price can be based on marginal costs or
average costs associated with the activation of balancing capacity.
Compared to marginal pricing, average pricing (e.g. Germany,
France) depresses price signals of the IB settlement. Therefore, it provides
less incentives for BRPs to maintain a balanced position and, in particu-
larly, for VRE generators to improve forecast accuracy [67]. Hence, average
pricing is inefficient in limiting balancing costs. Moreover, average pricing
is also to the disadvantage of the business case for flexible resources. As
average pricing reduces the occurrence of negative and/or extreme high IB
prices, it masks the system needs for investment in new flexible resources
able to provide upward/downward balancing within short lead time [15].
Similar to the impact of averaging pricing, the exclusion of costs
associated with capacity reservation of balancing services in
the IB price also acts as an inefficient design element limiting balancing
costs reduction. Vandezande et al. [120]; Hirth and Ziegenhagen [67]
suggest that capacity reservation costs, instead of being socialized, should
be included in the IB price via an additive component to reflect the full
costs of imbalance.
The low time resolution (e.g. hourly) of IB settlement may
also increase balancing costs. According to Fernande et al. [52] and
Vandezande [122], BRPs that are able to maintain a balanced position
over a long period of IB settlement can frequently cause imbalances
within the period. As a result, the IB settlement may hamper the cost-
reflective allocation of balancing costs [52], inefficiently increasing the
system demand for balancing services and associated balancing costs.
This is the case for Spain. In other MSs, the time resolution of IB
settlement is usually sub-hourly [48].
12 Voet [124] also points out feed-in schemes can act as a barrier for VRE to provide
balancing services in the BA market, because the loss of subsidies cannot be priced in the
energy price bid for capacity activation.
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In addition, Wawer [125] considers the system type, i.e. based on a
one-price system or a two-price system, as the most important design
element affecting the overall efficiency of the IB settlement. However,
views regarding the superiority between both systems in limiting
balancing costs differ among authors. Vandezande et al. [120];
Moeller and Fabozzi [91] prefer the one-price system, arguing that
passive balancing rewarded under a one-price system could reduce the
system needs for holding reserves and the associated balancing costs.
However, based on analysis of empirical data in Germany, Just and
Weber [83] have observed that passive balancing under a one-price
system also creates perverse incentives for strategic beha-
viors arbitraging between the DA spot price and the IB price.
As explained in Section 5.1, the mismatch between hourly spot prices
and sub-hourly IB prices for the same time period results in very low
correlation between the two price signals. Due to such low correlation,
BRPs tend to strategically over-contract and under-contract at high and
low DA spot prices, if the system imbalance is expected to be
respectively long and short. This strategic behavior could move the
system imbalance to the unfavorable direction, resulting in higher
demand for balancing capacity and additional balancing costs in an
estimated range of € 200–300 million per year [83]. The additional
balancing costs associated with strategic behavior are very likely to
outweigh the expected costs savings from passive balancing under a
one-price system. Following the same case in Germany, Chaves-Avila
et al. [22] also reports that a one-price system could exacerbate
local imbalances in case of grid congestion, provided that
passive balancing gives perverse incentives for local BRPs to intention-
ally maintain an imbalanced position to the opposite direction of
system imbalance. Based on above analyses, a one-price system seems
to be less efficient in limiting balancing costs, in comparison to a two-
price system designed to prevent BRPs from any imbalance.
5.3. Potential barriers increasing grid costs in the LMP mechanism
The efficiency of LMP mechanism mainly depends on its system type,
i.e. zonal pricing or nodal pricing. Because of its limited representation for
grid constraints, zonal pricing (especially for large zones) is inefficient in
limiting grid costs, in comparison to nodal pricing. As the uniform price
across a single price zone cannot represent internal grid constraints, zonal
pricing fails to incentivize VRE investments to efficiently use existing grid
infrastructure within the same zone. Consequently, suboptimal decisions
could be made to invest in VRE at locations lacking grid capacity, resulting
in unnecessarily higher grid costs associated with grid extension and
expansion [11,94]. Moreover, exacerbated by increased loop flows asso-
ciated with the feed-in of VRE into the grid, zonal pricing increases the
chance of congestion in meshed networks, because its price signals fail to
inform the actual state of power flows [116,61]. Costs associated with grid
congestion management are often high due to the need to re-dispatch
plants. Recalling that IB settlement based on a one-price system could
exacerbate local imbalance in case of grid congestion, zonal pricing that is
inefficient in limiting grid costs and a one-price system that is inefficient in
limiting balancing costs could further undermine the efficiency of each
other.
6. Synthesis and policy recommendations
6.1. Synthesis
Fig. 5 shows that currently many barriers to the market integration
of VRE exist in the electricity market in Europe. Many of the barriers
lead to the same market inefficiency. Market integration barriers can
result in either higher integration costs, or endangered business cases
for investments in VRE and complementing flexible resources.
Fig. 5. Framework for market integration barriers.
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Therefore, they should be addressed to facilitate better market integra-
tion.
6.2. Policy recommendations
Based on this framework, we can draw policy recommendations on
how to improve the functioning of the electricity market that serves for
VRE market integration from two interrelated aspects. They respec-
tively relate to the reduction of integration costs (Section 6.2.1) and the
business case for VRE and complementing flexible resources (Section
6.2.2).
6.2.1. Reduction of integration costs
Market design elements within a single submarket have intra-
market or cross-market impacts on the market efficiency. They can be
improved along five dimensions to reduce integration costs:
• The price settlement rule should help to disclose and reflect the
marginal costs of balancing resources in all submarkets where
balancing costs occur. In this sense, in the ID and BA market,
pay-as-bid is inefficient and should be replaced to uniform marginal
pricing. Similarly, average pricing in the IB settlement that corre-
sponds to pay-as-bid in the BA market should be replaced by
marginal pricing. It is also suggested that the capacity reservation
costs should be included in the IB settlement price and asymmetrical
punitive components should be removed.
• The system type for each submarket should be selected on the
basis that it can better and robustly guarantee market efficiency and
liquidity. In this sense, continuous trading in the ID market should
be replaced by discrete auctions for better liquidity performance,
and zonal pricing in the LMP mechanism is recommended to be
replaced by nodal pricing for reducing grid costs. In addition, the
one-price system in the IB settlement may better be replaced by a
two-price system. This is because not only does a one-price system
encourage strategic behavior in the IB settlement, but it decreases
the liquidity performance of the ID market. It also aggravates local
imbalance, if in combination with zonal pricing.
• The low time resolution of trading products in different
submarkets cannot accurately reflect the physical reality of supply-
demand dynamics in a power system with increased VRE. Hourly
energy products in the DA market and IB settlement can give rise to
increased balancing costs in the IB settlement, due to insufficient
reflection of the sub-hourly variability and uncertainty associated
with VRE. Therefore, it is recommended to increase the time
resolution of energy products in the DA market and IB settlement
to quarter-hourly. This implies that the current low time resolution
of capacity products in the BA market should also be improved to
quarter-hourly, to better match the improved time resolution of DA
energy products and thus reduce costs associated with balancing
capacity products.
• The early gate closure time insufficiently close to real-time
delivery in different submarkets increase forecast errors of VRE
and associated balancing costs. In particular, the 12:00 P.M. DA
gate closure time can severely limit the possibility of trading VRE in
wholesale without considerable impact on balancing costs. The
authors propose to bring the DA gate closure time to 4 h before
delivery. Based on Spanish wind farm data [73], such gate closure
time can guarantee forecast errors well below 10%. It may also make
a compromise with the lead time requirement for thermal plants to
schedule their generation in a cost-efficient manner [111]. We
suggest further studies to investigate such trade-off. As for the ID
and BA market, their gate closure time should be no more than
60 min before delivery to minimize balancing costs.
• The lack of joint optimization between BA capacity market and
DA/ID energy market increases balancing costs. The electricity
market design should enable such joint optimization, meaning that
commitments to DA/ID energy market and BA capacity market
should not be mutually exclusive.
Fig. 6 illustrates how the set-up of EU electricity market might look
like once recommended improvements of design elements are made for
each submarket. The red color is used to mark the main improvements.
Market inefficiencies may also arise from relevant policy and
regulation schemes that distort the electricity market. Their negative
impacts mainly concentrate on the DA spot market where profile costs
occur. These policy schemes include weak carbon price under the
current EU ETS scheme, feed-in schemes, price-cap regulation limiting
the scarcity price to a level well-below the VOLL, and regulations and
retroactive subsidies for retaining overcapacity. They exacerbate the
market value reduction of VRE and thus increase profile costs.
Improved policy and regulation schemes can thus lower profile costs
and strengthen the business case for VRE and complementing flexible
resources because of improved market value. These will be discussed in
the next section.
6.2.2. Business case for VRE and complementing flexible resources
Market integration requires the electricity market fits the business
case for VRE and complementing flexible resources. Market integration
barriers, however, can reduce the feasibility of the business case for
investments in VRE and flexible resources in the electricity market, and
they should be removed:
• Feed-in schemes provide disincentives for VRE generators to
maximize their market value in the electricity market, increasing the
required subsidy level and locking VRE investments in a subsidy-
dependent pathway. To avoid potential lock-in and support the
business case of VRE investment in the electricity market, the
authors argue that a direct capacity-based support scheme on top
of the market revenue of VRE investments might be a better
alternative to the current feed-in schemes. Not only does it minimize
direct distortions on the electricity market, but it can incentivize
VRE generators to maximize their market value. As the commercial
maturity of VRE improves, the capacity-based support scheme can
be degressive. Such capacity-based support scheme has been favored
by a few authors, e.g. Andor et al. [3]; Eurelectric [49]; Bunn and
Munoz [17]; Huntington et al. [71].
• The weak carbon price under the current EU ETS scheme is
insufficient to internalize the climate externality. It decreases the
market value of VRE and creates an unleveled playing field for VRE
to compete with fossil-fired generation technologies in the electricity
market. Therefore, it reduces the business case for VRE investments.
To address this issue, the carbon price should be increased to a level
closer to the SCC.13 It is estimated that a minimum carbon price at
60 €2013/Tonne is required to make VRE investments break-even in
the electricity market, relying on the market revenue alone [32].
Similarly, explicit and implicit subsidies for fossil fuels also put VRE
investments at a competitive disadvantageous position. If these
subsidies are not removed, the business cases for VRE investments
might remain unsound even in the long run. In that case, the market
integration objective seems impossible to achieve.
• The scarcity price is essential for maintaining the functioning of
the electricity market in remunerating investments in VRE and
flexible resources. However, the level and frequency of scarcity price
are reduced by price-cap regulation and retroactive subsidies for
retaining overcapacity. This clearly reduces the feasibility of busi-
ness cases for VRE and flexible resources, due to insufficient revenue
for capital costs recovery. Therefore, the authors suggest policy-
makers to lift up the price cap to the VOLL and accelerate the phase-
13 Based on the Stern Review [114]he SCC is estimated at 123 €2013/Tonne CO2eq for
the year 2013. The SCC is also expected to increase at a rate of 2–3% per year [2].
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out of excessive inflexible baseload capacity. This can help the
electricity market to restore its functioning.
• The electricity market should provide a level playing field for all
market participants. VRE generators capable of providing cost-
efficient downward balancing services should be encouraged to
participate in the BA market. However, unfavorable market design
elements in terms of early gate closure time and low resolution of
capacity products limit the possibility for their participation. The
exclusion of VRE in the BA market excludes potential revenues from
the BA market, which is detrimental to their business case. Hence, to
facilitate the business case of VRE, the gate closure of BA market
should be moved close to real time (e.g. 1 h before delivery) and the
resolution of capacity products should be increased to at least hourly
and ideally quarter-hourly.
6.3. Further research
This study has qualitatively assessed barriers to the market
integration of VRE through a literature review. To facilitate market
integration, recommendations were given regarding how to improve
the market design and relevant policy and regulation schemes. The
authors propose further researches to quantitatively assess the impact
of these improvements. In particular, a cost-benefit analysis is neces-
sary to analyze the pro and cons of the new market set-up (as suggested
in Fig. 6) and to what extent it can reduce integration costs. In
addition, it is still unclear at what level the proposed capacity-based
support scheme can provide sufficient security for VRE investors to de-
risk their investments and limit the cost of capital. Model-based studies
are required to further investigate this issue.
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